I wish to comment upon Mr. Hendel's suggestion along two lines: 1) the feasibility of Hume's solution; and 2) the implications of empiricism for man's freedom as knower and agent. Of course, Hume's skepticism did draw the "sting out of physical necessity and made it harmless," as Hendel indicates. But the force of this skepticism was also to impugn reason--or reasoning--and this the philosophes were unwilling to countenance. That man was an unknowable factor in an equally unknowable universe did not (...) fit in with their notion of a proper fruit of the philosophical enterprise. And though they were caught between the demands of the moral life and the persuasion of the scientific world view, their belief, that they should stick with the problem of talking about man and his world in the same categories without being skeptical about either, was sound. They must have felt that skepticism was a relatively easy and simple expedient, and a position incompatible with that of scientific naturalism. (shrink)

IN his article, "Decision and Existence," Newton P. Stallknecht suggests that the insight of the existentialist should be brought to bear on the traditional problem of characterizing existence. In particular, he is concerned to show how the philosophy of Leibniz involves a mode of thinking which has "failed to apprehend the true quality of existence." Because the "extreme 'essentialism' of Leibniz's theology stands... in contrast with his keen sense of the individual and the spontaneous," this philosophy, the author contends, should (...) appeal to, and fascinate, the student of existentialism. Let us note that two questions are involved in the issue as presented by Mr. Stallknecht. (shrink)